Gold exchange standard in its 40th year of abolition: Jacques Rueff re-visited by Bayramoglu, Onur
  
 
 
 
 
G
L
O
B
A
L
 
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
 
T
R
E
N
D
S
 
C
E
N
T
E
R
 
(
G
P
o
T
)
 
 POLICY BRIEF 
     GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) 
 
 
 
GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD IN ITS 40TH YEAR OF ABOLITION: 
JACQUES RUEFF RE-VISITED 
 
ONUR BAYRAMOĞLU 
                                             October 2011 | GPoT PB no. 28 
 
ABSTRACT While the post-war international monetary system that evolved under the 
leadership of the U.S. dollar has secured credit abundance – and hence contributed to global 
growth – the system has also revealed its deficiencies already by 1950’s. In contrary to the 
1930’s when the world’s main problem was chronic deflation; two decades later, the 
problem has become chronic inflation and fiscal deficits. Since then many blamed the 
indiscipline of the Keynesian school of thought and the inability of the U.S. dollar to become 
a global “public good” by being a stable international currency. In this Policy Brief, I overview 
the many aspects of the post-war international monetary system through the lens of the 
post-war French economist, Jacques Rueff, and question the applicability of his long-
proposed gold standard in today’s highly integrated and speculative money markets. 
 
Introduction 
On August 15
th
 1971, the U.S. President 
Richard Nixon abolished the direct 
convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold, 
which ended the gold exchange standard 
of the Bretton Woods system. Since then, 
the U.S. dollar, without any real back up, 
became the global fiat money, dropping 
gold’s long-run legacy as the world’s 
reserve currency. Though the debate 
about the role of the U.S. dollar within the 
international monetary system began back 
in the 1960’s, the unilateral abolishment 
of the convertibility of the U.S. dollar to 
gold in 1971 intensified opposing argu-
ments towards the current monetary 
system. Many thought that the system 
that established the U.S. dollar as the 
world’s reserve currency did not provide a 
global “public good” that secured a stable 
world currency and this fact, they argued, 
led to boom and bust cycles in the global 
economy. 
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In about every 18 months, the global 
economy experiences some sort of a 
monetary convulsion. Such experiences, 
during the last 10 years, were felt in 
different parts of the world that included 
Latin America and most of Asia.  One of 
the core ideas was that the Fed created 
credit was responsible for 
the boom and bust cycles in 
the global economy that led 
to financial bubbles in 
different parts of the world.  
Today, we are living in a 
world where capital controls 
have been dismantled in 
most countries; a move that 
deeply affected national 
equity and bond markets 
through rapid flows of foreign money. 
Referred to as “Casino Capitalism”, today’s 
world money markets are being operated 
by traders who move billions of dollars 
worth of monetary assets around the 
globe without much structured overseeing 
by governments. This system also brings 
along currency speculations, giving way to 
massive destructions. As the dollar based 
monetary system is volatile and vulnerable 
to substantial shifts in exchange rates, a 
lot of international firms choose to hedge. 
This can be considered as a part of the 
cost they must incur for operating in a 
global economy without a stable exchange 
rate.  
In this Policy Brief, I investigate the post-
war Bretton Woods monetary system 
through historical, political, economical, 
philosophical, and structural perspectives, 
and analyze the positive and negative 
aspects of a potential alternative – i.e. the 
gold standard. In the first section of the 
brief, I recount a short history of the post-
war international monetary system, 
explaining how dollar based growth 
around the globe evolved in a way that led 
to inflation, global imbalances, and fiscal 
deficits. In the second section, I put 
forward the ideas of some of the most 
influential post-war thinkers such as 
Keynes and Hayek who widely influenced 
the monetary system. In this section, I also 
bring out the ideas of Jacques Rueff – the 
protagonist of the brief – 
explaining how he consti-
tuted a middle way between 
Keynes and Hayek but was 
generally disregarded during 
the post-war economic 
structuring period. In the 
third section, I analyze the 
alternatives to Dollar – 
namely Euro and Yuan – 
where I reveal the incapa-
bility of these currencies to 
be the world’s reserve currency. After 
analyzing Dollar, Euro, and Yuan, in the 
fourth section, I question the applicability 
of a return to the gold standard in today’s 
highly integrated global economy in 
reference to Jacques Rueff who had put 
forward this idea more than 50 years ago. 
I then conclude in the fifth section by 
arguing that the gold standard, in today’s 
global economy, could only be applicable 
through the strengthening of multilateral 
global governance. 
The History of the Post-War Inter-
national Monetary System 
Even by the early 1950’s, the postwar 
world had begun to fulfill Roosevelt’s 
dreams of Pax-Americana. American 
statesmen – imposing liberal Wilsonian va-
lues – had reconstituted a global political 
economy, in which Europe and Japan had 
once again become the centers of 
commerce and finance. Many developing 
nations in Asia and Latin America had also 
started to benefit from the abundance of 
capital and liberal trade regime within this 
...today’s world money 
markets are being 
operated by traders who 
move billions of dollars 
worth of monetary assets 
around the globe without 
much structured 
overseeing by 
governments. 
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system. The newly created system re-
quired the U.S. to continuously incur fiscal 
deficits so that global growth could be 
secured. The postwar U.S. governments 
were pressed to fulfill the simultaneous 
demands for more arms and welfare, and 
for more public and private investment 
and consumption, which were all covered 
by fiscal deficits and easy money.  
Under the Bretton Woods monetary 
system, the key element of this new 
regime was the U.S. dollar. The gold 
standard was already abolished during the 
interwar years, and the new Bretton 
Woods system had brought along the 
gold-exchange standard under which the 
U.S. dollar was established as world’s the 
reserve currency – replacing the previous 
Sterling in line with the Britain’s declining 
role in world politics. Accordingly, the 
dollar was fixed to gold at a rate of 35 USD 
per ounce, and all other world currencies 
were tied to the U.S. dollar. The 
experiences of the Great Depression that 
erupted in 1929 were key during the 
structuring of the Bretton Woods system. 
During the 1930’s, the main challenge that 
the global economy faced was deflation 
and the scarcity of capital. Within this 
perspective, what worried the Americans 
about the Gold Standard 
system was that not only a 
great amount of the world’s 
gold reserves were stocked 
in the Soviet Russia and 
South Africa, but also that 
the amount of gold was not 
large enough to secure a 
world economy that could 
operate under a liberal trade regime. 
Moreover, as the principles of Keynesian 
school of thought would confirm, a U.S. 
economy that operates under fiscal 
deficits would also trigger inflation – 
which in turn would diminish the U.S. gold 
reserves as would be required under the 
discipline of the gold standard. On the 
other hand, under the gold exchange 
standard, the U.S. – as the issuer of the 
world’s reserve currency – could instead 
finance its deficits by spreading inflation 
to the rest of the world. 
While in the 1930’s the main problem of 
the world economy was chronic deflation; 
two decades later, it became chronic 
inflation. During most of the 1950’s, the 
Eisenhower Administration struggled with 
the inflationary tendencies generated by 
huge jumps in the U.S. military outlays 
initiated by the Korean War. Additionally, 
neo-Keynesian fiscal doctrines, popula-
rized to rationalize a tax cut in 1964 could 
be summoned to justify federal deficits 
under almost any circumstances. Inflation 
and the worsening balance of payments 
were the natural consequences.  
Although the flood of expatriate dollars 
was welcomed in the late 1940’s and 
1950’s – when Europe’s growth and pros-
perity depended heavily on American 
credit – by the 1960’s, the Bretton Woods 
system and the international role of the 
dollar started to become an issue between 
the U.S. and the other actors of the global 
economy, which first and foremost 
included the Europeans. 
French President, Charles de 
Gaulle, in a press conference 
in 1965, criticized the 
international role of the 
dollar, saying that the U.S. 
and the U.S dollar had an 
“exorbitant privilege” that 
no other country previously 
had. General de Gaulle argued that 
because the Bretton Woods made the 
dollar the indispensible reserve currency, 
Americans could print their money at will 
and the rest of the world would have to go 
on accepting it due to international 
settlements. Having regarded the situation 
While in the 1930’s the 
main problem of the 
world economy was 
chronic deflation; two 
decades later, it became 
chronic inflation. 
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as economically unfair and politically 
abusive under the Bretton Woods system, 
the U.S. was able to “export inflation” to 
Europe without any consideration. For de 
Gaulle, the only solution to prevent such 
an outcome was going back to the gold 
standard. Dollars, he said, were an 
unacceptable foundation for the 
international economy because they had 
no real value. By contrast, gold had a 
“nature that did not change” and “was 
held eternally and universally, as the 
unalterable fiduciary value per excellence” 
(Chivvis, 2006, p. 713). 
There is little doubt that the French 
theorist and economist, Jacques Rueff was 
the one who influenced General de Gaulle 
in 1965 to organize such a conference, 
where he related the global power of the 
U.S. to the role of the dollar and called for 
a return to the gold standard. I will talk 
more about the theories of Rueff in the 
following sections, yet it is necessary, for 
now, to mention that his campaign to 
return to gold began in 1961 and focused 
largely on the problems 
of the dollar and the US 
deficits. Rueff feared that 
US deficits would destroy 
the international econo-
my and thereby the unity 
of the democratic and 
non-communist West. At 
the same time, Rueff 
claimed, the indiscri-
minate growth of dollar 
reserves abroad posed a 
threat to the world credit 
system. As the amount of 
dollars abroad increased, the capacity of 
the USA to redeem those dollars for gold 
would diminish. A collapse of the dollar 
seemed likely if speculators began to lose 
their confidence in the dollar since dollar 
had no real value to back it up. This could 
result in a mega deflation around the 
globe. Similarly, the 2008 global economic 
crisis can also be attributed to such a loss 
of confidence among the investors.  
Despite Rueff’s, and in general France’s, 
efforts to make radical changes within the 
global economy and the international 
monetary system, the adjustment did not 
reflect his suggestions. By mid-1968, the 
U.S. administration was having great 
difficulty maintaining the exchange rate of 
the dollar – given the high military 
spending for the Vietnam War and high 
civilian spending for Johnson’s Great 
Society Program. In addition, American 
producers were complaining that the 
dollar was overvalued – which limited U.S. 
competitiveness. Under Bretton Woods, 
the dollar was convertible to gold at a 
fixed parity and therefore was impossible 
to devalue.  
The solution that the U.S. Administration 
found for these challenges was the “New 
Economic Policy” that was introduced by 
the President Nixon on August 15, 1971. 
The centerpiece of the 
Policy was abolishing the 
convertibility of dollar to 
gold indefinitely, along 
with controls on domes-
tic wages and prices. 
With this new policy, 
Nixon complemented 
the chronic inflationary 
tendencies with frequent 
depreciations of the 
dollar. When wage and 
price controls were lifted 
in 1973, American infla-
tion exploded, spreading to the rest of the 
world.  
Having said that, by 1973, the global 
inflation could no longer be blamed 
exclusively on the Americans. In 1968, a 
powerful wave of strikes had erupted in 
By mid-1968, the U.S. 
administration was having great 
difficulty maintaining the 
exchange rate of the dollar... In 
addition, American producers 
were complaining that the dollar 
was overvalued – which limited 
U.S. competitiveness. Under 
Bretton Woods, the dollar was 
convertible to gold at a fixed 
parity and therefore was 
impossible to devalue. 
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France and later spread to the rest of 
Europe. To calm down the protestors who 
were asking for more generous social 
rights, a welfare state and wage increases, 
several European states, notably France 
(but not Germany) increased government 
spending and hence adopted an 
inflationary course parallel to that of the 
United States.  
While the main source of American 
inflation was military spending, parti-
cularly because the Vietnam War was 
dragging on, in Europe, too much social 
spending was adding on to the global 
inflation that was already generated by 
the Americans. The eruption of the First 
Oil Crisis in 1973 and the quadrupling of 
the petroleum prices had further worse-
ned the situation, causing the United 
States to experience the worst recession 
since the 1930’s. Lacking the American 
dollar’s privilege to inflate their way out of 
the oil crisis, the damages of the First Oil 
Shock were felt more in vulnerable 
Western Europe, which in turn led to 
excessive government debts. 
The Carter Administration that took the 
office in 1977 continued implementing 
Nixon’s expansionist formula. Through 
their neo-Keynesian recipe, they offered 
the Europeans to join them in expanding 
their economies so that the rest of the 
world could be taken out of recession. 
However, the Second Oil Shock of 1979 
forced the Americans themselves to 
abandon the expansionist formula. The 
appointment of strong-minded Paul 
Volcker as the Chairman of Federal 
Reserve in 1979 brought a complete 
change in American monetary politics. 
Volcker who believed that there had to be 
an abrupt monetary check to prevent 
dollar’s fall – managed to end the 
stagflation crises of the 1970’s. 
However, when Reagan was elected as the 
U.S. president in 1981 – under whom the 
United States faced huge increases in 
military spending – the monetary rigor 
could only continue along with deteriora-
ting fiscal deficits. As Volcker continued 
his tight monetary policy in this period, 
the United States – given the low domestic 
savings rate – had to look for alternatives 
to finance the increases in its military 
spending. The only remaining alternative 
for the U.S. Treasury was to borrow most 
of the world’s free capital. High interest 
rates in the U.S. both attracted investors, 
and kept the floating dollar valuable. Since 
then, there have been sharp deterio-
rations in American trade and the U.S. 
current account deficit, also known as the 
“twin deficits.” 
The Theories of Jacques Rueff: 
Under the Shade of Keynes and 
Hayek 
For the purposes of our discussion, the 
visions of two theorists who had 
significant impacts in shaping the postwar 
economic structures are particularly im-
portant. These theorists are namely John 
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) and Fried-
rich Von Hayek (1899-1992). Therefore, I 
will first begin with brief introductions of 
the theories of Keynes and Hayek. Then I 
will move to Jacques Rueff (1896-1978) – 
the protagonist of the brief – and will try 
to portray the post-war system through 
his eyes.  
 John Maynard Keynes 
According to Keynes, probably the most 
influential twentieth century economist, 
national economies of 1920s had 
stabilized at a low point because people 
wanted to save more than entrepreneurs 
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wanted to invest. Under existing 
productivity levels during the interwar 
years, wage levels – held up by the unions 
– were too high. High wages were obstruc-
ting entrepreneurial projects, which in 
turn led to low investment, and hence 
high unemployment. Meanwhile, interest 
rates, already low, could fall no further 
because savers would refuse to risk their 
capital. Keynes thought that this was a 
vicious cycle that could only be broken by 
the government. Governments had to 
boost demand and investment, preferably 
through spending on public goods. As 
David Calleo puts it, the market equilib-
rium required an enlightened government 
intervention to work properly.  
Believing in the self-destructive instability 
of capitalism, Keynes argued that national 
economies had to be manipulated as a 
solution. The eruption of the Cold War 
also helped Keynes receive the necessary 
support for his ideas. Under the threat of a 
common enemy – the Soviet Union – the 
transatlantic allies had to cover the syn-
dromes of the interwar years’ capitalism, 
which were deflation, low consumption, 
and unemployment. Fiscal deficits and 
easy money were needed in order to 
secure growth and prosperity. Keynes, in 
other words, was suggesting an alterna-
tive for the post-war system that would 
combine national interventionist econo-
mies that would secure full employment 
with a liberal international order.  
From the monetary perspective, this 
required abundance of capital and fiscal 
deficits. While the triumphant Americans 
were insisting on a global economy based 
on free trade and easily convertible 
currencies after the war, Keynes, on the 
other hand, struggled to create a mone-
tary regime with enough leeway for the 
national demand management that he 
prescribed. He imagined a world central 
bank under technocratic direction – the 
“Clearing Union” that was his high goal for 
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 
(Calleo, 2001, p. 75). In this regard, the 
post war system included the Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund (IMF), but the IMF fell 
far short of Keynes’ hopes. Instead of a 
“clearing” international currency, the U.S. 
dollars would be the world’s reserve 
currency.  
 Friedrich Von Hayek 
The Keynesian system had brought growth 
and social consensus in post-war Europe 
up until the 1960’s. However, the new 
prosperity that emerged under the 
Keynesian spending led to a new problem. 
In the decade before World War II 
deflation was the biggest problem. 
However two decades after the war, the 
problem was rather becoming chronic 
inflation. Hayek held the Keynesian system 
responsible for this emerging problem.  
Criticizing the post-war international 
economic structure in the democratic 
West built on the ideas of Keynes, Hayek 
argued that combining communitarian 
democracy with communitarian welfare 
inevitably meant spiraling government 
debt. Hayek believed that financing the 
rapidly mounting deficits after the end of 
World War II inevitably meant monetizing 
them. This had led to an accelerating 
inflation that threatened private capital, 
destroying liberty and economic 
efficiency.  
For Hayek, the principal function of the 
states was to enforce egalitarian rules to 
govern the market economy. While 
Keynes had emphasized the destabilizing 
tendencies of the market economy, Hayek 
referred to the dangers of unlimited state 
power. Unlike Keynes, Hayek believed that 
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the states had the responsibility for stable 
money supply. The state had to supply the 
money under a disciplined approach. The 
dollar system that had emerged under the 
United States was causing global 
imbalances throughout the world due to 
the lack of discipline within the system. 
Americans – under the populism of demo-
cracy – were inflating the global economy. 
For him, it was this laxity within the 
system that was causing recessions and 
crises in the global economy. Central 
banks and the market economy had to be 
governed under established rules.  
By the end of his life, Hayek was being 
referred to as the sage of “neocon-
servatism” in America and “Thatcherism” 
in Britain. Though not as popular after the 
end of World War II, Hayek’s liberal 
theories represented an escape from the 
disruptive characteristics of the post-war 
welfare system in Wes-
tern Europe – which the 
states had difficulties 
financing starting from 
late-1970’s. His teachings 
were also embodied in 
the European Union’s 
drive to achieve mone-
tary union around the 
strict fiscal and monetary regime imposed 
by the Maastricht criteria and the 
subsequent Stability and Growth Pact. 
 Jacques Rueff 
Whether it is the declining stance of 
France as a world power, or French 
President Charles de Gaulle’s anti-system 
character, the ideas Jacques Rueff – the 
French theorist and economist – were 
mainly overlooked during the formation of 
the post-war international economic 
structure. Rueff represented a school of 
thought that fit somewhere in between 
Keynes’ and Hayek’s – with a closer stance 
to Hayek.  
Although Rueff, being a high-level servant 
of the state, did not share the strong 
liberal views of Hayek, he also believed in 
the connection between a free market and 
liberal democracy – as well as the thesis 
on democracy’s inflationary proclivity. 
Rueff was especially insistent on the link 
between stable money supply and liberal 
political order. Within this perspective, he 
was anti-Keynesian and believed that 
governments were taking the first steps 
towards totalitarianism and the 
destruction of liberty, “thus threatening 
the foundation of the Western civilization 
and culture” (Chivvis, 2006, p. 704). 
In Rueff’s view, therefore, the only 
legitimate aim of monetary policy could be 
price stability. Like many in the conser-
vative liberal group, Rueff’s 
formative expe-riences were 
during the interwar period. 
He believed that returning 
to Gold Standard, which had 
collapsed during the inter-
war period was the only 
solution for price stability 
and discipline. Believing that 
discretionary monetary poli-
cy would never be able to meet the 
money demand, Rueff offered gold stan-
dard’s automatic adjust-ment of supply 
and demand for money.  
Other than his exceptional support for the 
gold standard, what distinguished him 
from Hayek was that Rueff thought free 
market was in fact compatible with social 
spending. Unlike Hayek who argued that 
the state had to distance itself from 
pursuing “distributive justice” or caring for 
the helpless, Rueff argued that free 
market was by itself, not sufficient for 
society. He believed that the state would 
Believing that discretionary 
monetary policy would never 
be able to meet the money 
demand, Rueff offered gold 
standard’s automatic 
adjustment of supply and 
demand for money. 
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naturally have to become more generous 
in aiding the less fortunate and provide 
basic services. However, there also had to 
be a limit to this aid, and this limit had to 
based on the state’s capacity to raise 
revenue. For Rueff, the free market was 
an artificial creation of human ingenuity, 
not something that had arisen 
spontaneously from nature. He thought 
that the liberal economy was a particular, 
advanced stage of human development 
that rested on a complex set of historically 
evolved legal institutions, which them-
selves required the full support of the 
state (Chivvis, 2006, p. 706). A stable 
monetary system was vital to support the 
free market under these institutions, 
which meant discipline under the gold 
standard.  
Pointing out that the price of gold had 
been fixed since the 1930’s and the price 
of other goods had risen substantially 
since then, he proposed an increase in the 
price of gold, which would also be 
beneficial to the USA with its substantial 
gold reserves. Rueff recognized that the 
gold standard needed constant adjust-
ment of the parities and therefore he did 
not think that the gold standard was 
indestructible. However, his vision did not 
demand a radical departure from the 
Bretton Woods principles or the institu-
tional arrangements other than the gold-
exchange standard. For him, the supra-
national institutions were needed utmost 
to back up the order that would be 
enhanced by the gold standard. In other 
words, Rueff hoped for the continuation 
of the Bretton Woods system with the 
critical exception that the gold standard 
replaces the gold exchange standard – to 
which the U.S. dollars were fixed as the 
reserve currency. 
Just like Hayek, Rueff feared the populism 
of the democracy. He surely recognized 
that any country could voluntarily limit its 
money supply without the discipline of the 
gold standard. However, he believed that 
this would never be possible under the 
democratic system where governments 
were obliged to satisfy the demands of the 
electorate.  
On the opposite side, a French 
philosopher, Raymond Aron dismissed the 
argument for gold as a thing of the past, 
“like sailing ships and oil lamps” (Chivvis, 
2006, p. 710). His idea was that the 
expanding world economy required more 
liquidity, and if the United States was to 
correct its balance of payments, the global 
economy could face with a credit crunch 
that would be similar to the Great 
Depression of 1929. While economists 
such as the Belgian Robert Triffin saw 
these deficits as necessary; Rueff regarded 
them as dangerous. Rueff’s lifespan was 
not long enough to see the 2008 global 
economic crisis when his thesis was 
confirmed. The core of the crisis was not 
the scarcity of the capital, but rather the 
abundance of unregulated capital.  
Before analyzing the applicability of the 
gold standard in today’s conditions, let us 
expand the discussion to two other 
currencies, Euro and Yuan, which also 
have global aspirations in the international 
monetary system.  
The Problems of Alternative Reser-
ve Currencies: Euro and Yuan 
By the early 1980’s, the U.S. trade account 
deficits had turned into current account 
deficits. Despite surviving both the Reagan 
Administration and the Cold War, the U.S. 
current account deficits set new records in 
the 1990’s – despite the  few years of 
improvement at the end of the Cold War. 
Under normal circumstances, it would be 
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quite exceptional for a country to hold 
such large deficits for such a long period of 
time. Yet, the role of the U.S. dollar and 
the large size of its economy made the 
United States as an exceptional country. In 
other words, the U.S. used its huge 
economics size and hegemonic monetary 
power to induce the rest of the world to 
finance its deficits.  
During the Cold War, American deficits 
were one of main pillars that secured the 
functioning of the global economy. 
Following Europe’s recovery, American 
deficits were used to finance the growth 
of Asia – thanks to the U.S. purchasing 
power that enabled the country to 
become the main market for the Asian 
goods. Since then, America’s bilateral 
trade deficits have been primarily with 
Asian countries that first started with 
Japan, then included the “Asian Tigers” 
and finally continued with China. Within 
this perspective, today we see a discon-
certing interdependence between China’s 
growth and the American indebtedness. 
Another striking characteristic of this 
system was that the special position that 
the U.S. held in the global economy due to 
its ability to export the U.S. dollars, caused 
the formation of a huge 
pool of unregulated capital. 
Though this capital might 
be considered beneficial 
due to its contributions to 
global growth, its unregu-
lated nature under the 
hands of private investors, 
gave way to manipulations 
and speculations through-
out the world. This was, in a way, the 
United States’ abandoning of its commit-
ment to provide a stable international 
currency, or a “public good,” as the logics 
of the Bretton Woods agreement would 
require. 
The role of the U.S. dollar within the 
international monetary system has been 
debated since then. The emergence of the 
Euro was a reaction to the United States’ 
inability and laxity to fulfill its commitment 
to supply a stable international currency 
that would contribute to the world’s libe-
ral trade regimes. Frustrated Europeans, 
vulnerable to the dollar and even more 
vulnerable to volatile exchange rates 
among themselves, began planning a 
monetary union with a single currency. On 
January 1
st
, 2001, 12 EU members gave up 
their own currencies and adopted the 
Euro.  
Regarded from a positive perspective, a 
common currency eliminates transaction 
and hedging costs. Not only does it make 
the prices more transparent and hence 
increases the competition, but it also 
increases cross-border investment among 
different European countries. More than 
10 years after its establishment, Euro has, 
in fact, succeeded in these aspects, 
becoming the currency of Europe. 
However, it is doubtful whether it has 
reached such a success level in the 
international arena. First of all, it is hard to 
say that the European Union, which had 
introduced the Euro as the world’s 
alternative reserve curren-
cy, has a political union 
that is equivalent to that of 
the United States. Euro-
pean bond market is not 
united as every Eurozone 
country is issuing its own 
Euro bonds, which causes 
diversification in interest 
rates. This also leads to 
misperceptions in determining the value 
of the Euro. As there is no single Euro 
bond market, the European financial 
markets are not as deep, sophisticated 
and liberal when compared to American 
markets. In other words, trying to impose 
The emergence of the Euro 
was a reaction to the United 
States’ inability and laxity to 
fulfill its commitment to 
supply a stable international 
currency that would 
contribute to the world’s 
liberal trade regimes. 
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a homogenous monetary union in such a 
diverse area can be expected to be more 
damaging than the extra cost of 
exchanging currencies or the costs that 
come from shifting the exchange rates. 
Europe’s inability to respond to the Greek 
crisis in a timely manner also revealed the 
political differences between Eurozone 
countries. Such experiences increase the 
suspicions of investors regarding the 
future of the Euro, further decreasing 
their confidence to the currency. 
Not only does Europe have less 
sophisticated financial markets, but also 
the Eurozone growth rates are very 
limited. Under the circum-
stances of a highly globa-
lized world, Western Euro-
pe’s high costs and sticky 
regulations threaten to 
make its home-based 
enterprises and labor un-
competitive. It is for this 
reason that a lot of Euro-
pean production shifted 
away from Europe and 
moved to Asia. Compared 
to the booming United Sta-
tes of the 1990s, Europe 
seems slow in deploying its resources to 
the industries and services that are 
needed to sustain the high living 
standards.  
Additionally, Europe’s increasing isolation 
from world politics has also limited the 
upwelling of Euro as a global currency. 
Europe seems to be stuck in a mood that 
can be described as indifference to what is 
going on outside its borders. According to 
the IMF statistics, the share of Euro as the 
world’s reserve currency was less than 
30% in 2010. That is roughly equal to the 
amount of Europe’s share within the 
world economy – confirming that Euro’s 
legacy is only applicable inside Europe, but 
not outside. It seems, instead of a world 
economy where one radical imbalance 
(the American deficit) sustains another 
(the Asian surplus), Europeans favored a 
regime where all countries and regions 
stay in external equilibrium because they 
guard their own external balances.  
On the other hand, some analysts have 
put forward the idea that rising U.S. 
indebtedness combined with China’s rising 
economic and financial prowess would 
lead to the decline of the Dollar and the 
rise of the Yuan as the dominant reserve 
currency. Many have, therefore, drawn 
parallels between today’s situation and 
the Dollar replacing Ster-
ling during the inter-war 
and post-WWII period. 
Despite parallels in this 
regard, Yuan also has fun-
damental limitations. As 
Papaiouanna and Portes 
(2008) argues, several 
conditions – such as the 
size of the economy, low 
inflation, exchange rate 
stability, deep and efficient 
financial markets, political 
stability, and geopolitical 
strength – underpin the currency’s inter-
national use.  
In terms of economic size, China is 
expected to overtake the U.S. by 2025. 
Chinese Yuan also seems a suitable match 
in terms of exchange rate stability and 
inflation. Yet, China has controls on the 
capital markets and its exchange rate is 
quasi-pegged. It is not clear how stable its 
exchange rate would be once the controls 
and peg are removed. Its banking system 
is not market based as the Chinese 
financial system is under the control of the 
government. What China lags most in is 
not having deep and efficient capital 
markets and a full convertibility of its 
What China lags most in is 
not having deep and 
efficient capital markets and 
a full convertibility of its 
currency. Not only is the 
Yuan not convertible, but 
also the Chinese bond 
market is relatively small 
and illiquid with a limited 
access for foreigners, which 
makes investors reluctant to 
invest in Yuan assets. 
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currency. Not only is the Yuan not 
convertible, but also the Chinese bond 
market is relatively small and illiquid with 
a limited access for foreigners, which 
makes investors reluctant to invest in 
Yuan assets.  Last but not least, while 
China enjoys political stability, it still 
continues to be unsatisfactory with 
regards to the rule of law. Additionally, 
political conditions hold a lot of impor-
tance when becoming an international 
currency is concerned. Countries that do 
not have close political relations with 
Beijing will be less likely to acquire Yuan 
assets – and that includes Japan and India.  
Gold Standard: Outdated or Igno-
red? 
Having talked about the vulnerabilities of 
the U.S. dollar based system,and the 
deficiencies of the Euro and Yuan to 
challenge it as alternative reserve curren-
cies, let us carry the discussion to the gold 
standard – an idea that has not been 
popular among the post-war economists, 
but for Rueff: 
During the last three months – with the 
worries that there would be a fall in the 
U.S. dollar – we experienced huge increa-
ses in gold prices. Though many believed 
that this fall was speculative, in my belief, 
gold continues to be seen as a standard of 
soundness, or the commodity to flee to in 
the times of emergency, as the last store 
of value that can be counted on. In 
contrast to the post-war U.S. dollar based 
global economy that was heavily depen-
ded on the manipulation of the monetary 
system, gold represents discipline and 
security. In fact, under the gold standard, 
there is no place for global imbalances, 
business cycles, inflation, or currency 
crises.  
The soundness of the gold standard is 
both an advantage and a disadvantage. It 
is an advantage because all monetary 
politics are operated under market 
principles. However, it is also disadvanta-
geous since there is no room for monetary 
policy. Under this system, there is, in fact, 
no need for central banks, meaning that 
governments would have no control over 
the supply of money and have not ability 
to manipulate monetary politics when 
necessary. However, without the manipu-
lation of the monetary system and hence 
fiscal deficits, the post-war Keynesian 
economy would not be able to build the 
welfare states and secure the social 
consensus. The main problem with the 
gold standard was that nations were 
becoming obsessed with keeping their 
gold, rather than improving the business 
climate, and therefore contributing to 
global growth.  This, in today’s conditions, 
would mean protectionism and neo-
mercantilism. Additionally, world’s gold 
reserves are limited, and gold prices need 
readjustment once in a while so that the 
system does not curb global growth. 
In this regard, in line with Rueff’s views, 
gold standard also has its limitations. The 
solution that Rueff has proposed is the 
operation of the gold standard under the 
control of the international institutions. In 
other words, this requires the conti-
nuation of the Bretton Woods system, 
with the exception of reforming its two 
basic characteristics that were structural 
and operational. While the first is the 
replacement of gold with the U.S. dollar as 
the world’s reserve currency, the second 
requires the diminishing of U.S. influence 
on international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund or the World 
Bank – giving way to multilateral gover-
nance. Under this system, world’s gold 
reserves would be collected under the 
IMF, enhancing the creation of additional 
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liquidity within the Fund. This, in a way, 
would be the formation of a world 
monetary system that could bring discip-
line to gold as a world currency while 
limiting its mercantilist character through 
a strengthening of global governance.  
Throughout 1966, French officials argued 
for reforms very similar to those Rueff had 
put forward. At IMF and G-10 meetings, 
they complained about the lack of 
increase in gold prices. They further 
pointed out that “it was unfair that 
multilateral surveillance, to which all 
European countries were liable had never 
been applied to the USA, in spite of the 
long standing U.S. deficits” (Chivvis, 2006, 
p. 718). The common ground between the 
USA and France was finally found at a 
1967 meeting at Rio, where they agreed 
on the creation of additional liquidity 
within the IMF. However, rather than gold, 
the new asset would be called the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR), which was a modest 
victory for Rueff’s France. This new 
instrument was in fact a drawing right, 
and not a currency. Rueff has referred the 
SDR as “nothingness dressed up as a 
currency.” This defeat of Rueff’s ideas has 
been considered as the reflection of the 
relative weakness of French power within 
the global governance.  
Conclusion 
Emerging countries have more and more 
been demanding better roles in global 
governance. Politically, this requires a 
world where the balance of power is 
distributed equally among different parts 
of the world, replacing the hegemony of 
the American system. Though there is a 
trend towards multilateralism, there is 
also no regional political union that would 
be able to challenge the current monetary 
system. 
What Rueff admired about the gold 
standard was its ability to bring discipline 
within the international monetary system 
that could put an end to chronic global 
inflation, global imbalances, and fiscal 
deficits. However, on the flip side of the 
system there is deflation, the rise of 
mercantilism and the need for periodical 
price adjustments. A gold standard system 
that operates under the control of 
multilateral institutions could end such 
potential negative outcomes. However, 
this would require a very high level of 
multilateralism that would minimize the 
impacts of politics and populism in world’s 
monetary decisions – and would rather 
serve for common interests and perspec-
tives. Within this perspective, while the 
American global hegemony may show 
numerous signs of flagging, a balanced 
and cooperative plural system as a repla-
cement still seems far away.  
Note: Some of the ideas expressed in this 
Policy Brief were first mentioned in David 
Calleo’s “Rethinking Europe’s Future.” 
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